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DRUNKENNESS AS A CRIMINAL OFFENSE
Jerome Hal*
Consumption of intoxicating liquor,
and efforts to control anti-social results
are well-nigh universal phenomena.
From the laws of the ancient Hebrews"
and the discourses of the Greek phi-
losophers 2 to the Anglo-Saxon dooms,3
and down to the present time, control
of the harmful social effects of drunk-
enness has been a matter of public con-
cern.4 The first great English statute
on the subject was enacted in 1606 (4
Jac. I, c. 5). Its preamble provided:
"Whereas the loathsom and odious
sin of drunkenness is of late grown into
common use within this realm, being
the root and foundation of many other
enormous sins, as bloodshed, stabbing,
murder, swearing, fornication, adultery,
and such like, to the great dishonor of
God, and of our nation, the overthrow
of many good arts and manual trades,
the disabling of divers workmen, and
the general impoverishing of many good
subjects, abusively wasting the good
creatures of God . . ."
The penalty for each conviction was 5
shillings; if the offender was unable to
pay this fine, he was to be "committed
to the stocks for every offence, there to
remain by the space of six hours," "by
* Professor of Law, Indiana University Law
School. Author: Theft, Law and Society (1935),
Readings in Jurisprudence (1938), and various
articles.
The writer wishes to acknowledge the valu-
able help of Mr. Loren McGregor, Student As-
sistant, Indiana University Law School.
This paper was presented at the annual
meeting of the Research Council on Problems
of Alcohol under the auspices of the A. A. A. S.
at Philadelphia, December 29, 1940. It is a modi-
fication of the paper published in the Quart. J.
Studies on Alcohol, March, 1941.
1 Deut. XXXI, 18, 19, 20, 21; 1 Cor. VI, 10; Gal.
V, 21.
2 Plato, Laws, 666, 673.
which time," states Blackstone, "the
statute presumes the offender will have
regained his senses, and not liable to
do mischief to his neighbors."5  This
comment on the underlying purpose of
the statute is important. In this re-
gard, it must be stated at the outset
that the title of this paper is misleading
in the same way that thinking about
the problem to be discussed is generally
confused. It is necessary to fix a cor-
rect perspective. "Drunkenness" de-
notes a physical and mental state of
being which may be found in an indi-
vidual in the privacy of his room where
a lone drinker dissipates a melancholy
view of life; it may be found at re-
spectable parties where the bons
vivants gather to celebrate the latest
football victory. In these cases, no
criminal offense is committed 8-- what-
ever be the degree of intoxication or its
prevalence, and whatever the moralist
or theologian has to say about vice.
"Mere drunkenness," writes Bishop,
"with no act beyond, is not indictable
at the common law."T It is essential
3 2 Westermarck The Origin and Development
of Moral Ideas 339, refers to the prohibition
laws of Hlothhaere and Eadric.
4 For a brief survey of the early history of
legal control of drunkenness, see Disney, A
View of Ancient Laws against Immorality and
Profaneness (1729) Tit. VI, 257-271.
54 BL 64.
s See Pugh v. S. (Tex., 1909) 117 S. W. 817,
and generally 30 Am. Jurisp. 294.
7Cf. "Intoxication is not a crime in itself,
and in so far as I know has never been consti-
tuted a crime by statute." Mr. Justice Boyle in
McRae v. McLaughlin Motor Car Co. (1926) 1
D. L. R. 377, 378.
[297]
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to grasp this fully. It is not the drunk-
enness but the injury to other persons,
committed under the influence of alco-
hol that is relevant in law.8
Many Forms of Drunken Behavior
It has long been known, though
vaguely, that drunkenness is intimately
connected with a wide variety of forms
of criminal behavior. Crimes commit-
ted under alcoholic influence are char-
acterized by violence or negligence.
The former extend from creating a
nuisance through boisterous conduct in
public places, at one extreme, to homi-
cide, at the other. With the advent of
the automobile, criminal negligence has
become a matter of first importance. A
thorough study would include all types
of crime committed under the influence
of alcohol. There is no such study in
English.' We do not know how many
crimes are committed under the in-
fluence of alcoholic liquor; so far as
I am aware, apart from so-called
drunkenness, (i.e., disorderly conduct
in public, aggravated by intoxication),
drunken driving, and violation of liq-
uor laws, our statisticians have made
little or no effort to discover the in-
cidence of intoxication in criminal be-
havior.10 They have followed existing
administrative practices. Where a major
crime has been committed under in-
fluence of alcohol, there is naturally no
interest in prosecution for drunken-
ness; conviction, in practice in such
8 See Ramey v. S. (Ga., 1929) 151 S. E. 55. But
cf. Com. v. Conlin 184 Mass. 195. See infra for
apparent exceptions concerning "Common
drunkards, in a small minority of states."
9 Cf. Barbier, Le Delit Alcoolique (Paris,
1930) 19 pp.
1o Cf. the French criminal statistics.
11 1 J. Cr. L. & Criminol. No. 2, p. 100.
cases, is for the serious crime or none
at all. Hence-so far as prosecution
is concerned- the various offenses in
which drunkenness is an essential ele-
ment of the crime are relatively minor
ones. The following analysis will be
confined to these offenses, specifically
to so-called drunkenness and to
drunken driving.
The importance of these offenses can-
not be exaggerated. We deal here with
phenomena so widespread, so frequent,
so traditional, that they concern the
everyday life of the entire community.
Consider the following fragmentary but
nonetheless highly significant data:
Some years ago it was determined that
from one-half to two-thirds of all con-
victions in the minor courts of New
York were for drunkenness.I'In Massa-
chusetts, arrests for drunkenness in
1935 were almost three times as num-
erous as arrests for all other offenses
excepting those for motor vehicle and
traffic violations.2 Los Angeles re-
ported 41,878 arrests for drunkenness
in 1939.13 In the District of Columbia,
of all persons committed to jail in the
first three months of this year, 80.1%
were guilty of intoxication. 4 The na-
tional situation is quite inadequately
described in the Uniform Crime Re-
ports. Yet they show that almost one-
fourth of all arrests reported for the
six months' period, January 1 to June
30, 1940, consist of drunkenness and
12 Zottoli, The Problem of Alcoholism in the
Courts p. 5.
13 Tentative Draft, Committee on Tests for
Intoxication, 1940 Report to National Safety
Council.
14 Source: Persons Admitted Under Fine to
the Baltimore City, and D. C. Jails, Jan. to
March, 1940, U. S. Department of Commerce.
Wash., October 15, 1940.
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drunken driving. When it is consid-
ered that truly vast numbers of such
cases are not reported to the police;
that in vast numbers of such cases
known to the police, arrests are not
made; and that vast numbers of such
arrests are not reported by the police,
or, as in Baltimore, are simply lumped
with "disorderly conduct," some notion
of the prevalence of drunkenness and
drunken driving may be gained. De-
spite this, it is the shocking fact that
in this country, we have only just be-
gun the collaboration between scien-
tists and legal scholars which alone can
help in the solution of this aggravated
social problem. I wish to consider
briefly some of the relevant legal ques-
tions, each of which deserves the most
painstaking investigation possible.
Legal Problems
First, let me present a general view
of the statutory law on this subject.
Forty states make intoxication (us-
ually specifying "public") a criminal
offense. In eight states, the various
municipalities regulate this offense. The
statutes typically forbid "boisterous
or indecent conduct, or loud or profane
discourse in any public place or near
any private residence, not his own,"
while intoxicated.15 Some of the stat-
utes are not explicit as to appearance
in public, yet they are almost wholly
construed as requiring that. 6
Numerous statutes penalize special
classes-professional people and per-
".5 Ala. Code of 1928, Ch. 120, sec. 3883.
16 But see footnotes 36 and 44.
Various statutes make it a misdemeanor for
any habitual drunkard "to be found" in a
saloon, billiard or bowling alley, house of ill-
sons engaged in work that requires a
high degree of care to avoid public
injury. Thus about 15 states make it
a misdemeanor for employees in charge
of trains to be intoxicated. About the
same number penalize various public
officers for intoxication while on duty.
Many states make it a misdemeanor for
a physician to be intoxicated while act-
ing in his professional capacity. Many
states have statutes dealing with intoxi-
cation (usually "habitual") by den-
tists, nurses, optometrists, pharmacists,
lawyers, osteopaths, chiropractors, ad-
ministrators, executors, guardians, bar-
bers, jurors, architects, prison officers,
and others; these provide for either
temporary or permanent revocation of
license, or discharge from employment.
Every state, I believe, has one or more
statutes dealing with drunken driv-
ing. 7 In a few states, statutes forbid
carrying or discharging a gun while
hunting, if under the influence of liq-
uor. Other statutes concern drunken-
ness near special places, e.g., churches
and hospitals, where boisterous conduct
is particularly resented.
No doubt experience and reason sup-
port some of the above legislation; some
of it is of ancient origin; the general
purposes have long been recognized as
sound. But it by no means follows that
legislation in this field has benefited in
the least from recent scientific discov-
eries, from advance in social science,
or even from progress in legislative
drafting. That this legislation is by and
fame, etc., cf. for Colorado, 2 Hill's Stats. Sec.
1944.
17 For a summary of these statutes, see Motor-
Vehicle Traffic Conditions in the U. S. pp. 77-81.
U. S. Gov't. Prtg. Office, 1938.
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large a haphazard, unorganized, vague,
and dull-pointed instrument of social
control, is evident by examination of
the statute books of any jurisdiction18
in light of common knowledge of the
relevant social problems.
The laws themselves are extraordi-
narily ambiguous. Among the most
troublesome problems is what would
seem to be the most simple of all, name-
ly, the meaning of "drunkenness." In
some states no distinction is made be-
tween that and being "under the in-
fluence" of liquor. An Alabama court
asserted that "the difference is that of
Tweedle Dee and Tweedle Dum. If a
man is under the influence of intoxi-
cating liquors, he is intoxicated."19 On
the other hand, a Florida court held
that "Though all persons intoxicated
by the use of alcoholic liquors are
under the influence of intoxicating
liquors, the reverse of the proposition
is not necessarily true."20 An Arkansas
court avoided all difficulties by the
illuminating remark that, "It may be
well doubted whether the terms
'drunkenness' and 'soberness' are sus-
ceptible to any accurate definition for
practical purposes, as they sufficiently
define themselves. '22 The legal defini-
tions of "drunkenness" range from
Blackstone's "artificial, voluntarily con-
tracted madness, which, depriving men
of their reason, puts them in a tem-
18 Some advance has been made in certain
English statutes which quite properly distin-
guish and penalize more severely if the drunken
person is in possession of firearms or in charge
of a child under seven, and the like. Licensing
Act, 1902, S. 2. In this country, it has been
urged that drunkenness by a pedestrian on a
highway should be more severely dealt with
than at present; in view of the fact that such
persons are a danger not only to themselves,
but also to motorists and to other pedestrians
porary phrensy . . ,,23 to "a person
so under the influence of liquor as not
to be entirely himself is intoxicated,
yet he may not betray it by either
movement or word and his condition
may not be discernible by his intimate
friends.12 4 A Texas court sought fine
distinctions. "A man is said to be 'dead
drunk' when he is perfectly uncon-
scious-powerless. He is said to be
'stupidly drunk' when a kind of stupor
comes over him. He is said to be
'staggering drunk' when he staggers in
walking. He is said to be 'foolishly
drunk' when he acts the fool. All these
are cases of drunkenness; of different
degrees of drunkenness.125 An Idaho
Court declared that "to be intoxicated
. . . he need not have reached a state
of drunkenness."2 An Illinois Court
asserted: "'Drunk' and 'intoxicated'
are synonyms." 27
Can one make any sense whatever
out of these diversities de la lei? To
some extent these divergencies may be
explained by the fact that in some states
the drunken driving statutes include
one or the other term. Thus, as in
California, when the statute penalizes
driving "under the influence," etc., the
cases will naturally deal with that, and
not with "intoxicated," except inci-
dentally. Other divergencies may be
explainable by the fact that the terms
are differently construed when the
(where the motorist swerves to avoid striking
the inebriate), there is good ground for con-
sidering such proposals.
ig Holley v. State, 144 So. 535.
2o Cannon v. State, 91 Fla. 214; 107 So. 360.
22 . Co. v. Hamilton, 84 Ark. 81.
23 4 Bl. 26.
2t Paris, etc., B. Co. v. Robinson, 104 Tex. 482.
25 Id.
26 Packard v. O'Neil, 262 Pac. 881, 884.
27 P. v. Rowland, 335 Ill. 432.
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same court deals with different stat-
utes. Thus in the Florida case, quoted
above, the court was contrasting "under
the influence" as it appeared in a traffic
law with a statute making it man-
slaughter to cause death by automobile
while "intoxicated." If all the diffi-
culties could be accounted for on such
grounds, each jurisdiction might achieve
reasonable legal certainty by careful
interpretation of its various statutes.
Such certainty would be largely verbal;
but the difficulties run much deeper
than that. Such divergencies and
ambiguities as those indicated obstruct
analysis enormously. They mask real
problems that can be solved only by
well-directed research. Such variances
as those discussed, cumulate, confuse
and block efforts at basic clarification.
The problem is one which requires a
fresh beginning, and thorough study
by scholars collaborating in the various
relevant disciplines.
A second problem in connection with
the interpretation of these terms in
drunken driving statutes concerns the
degree of influence or intoxication prd-
scribed. In this connection, it is appar-
ent that the dangerous driver is not the
"dead drunk," but is, rather, the one
who can still operate the vehicle but
less ably than when normal, who is less
cautious and less able to meet an un-
expected situation with sufficient speed.
An Arizona court held that the slight-
est degree of lessened ability through
use of intoxicating liquor was illegal.
28
Perhaps more precise is the California
decision of impairment "to an appre-
28 Hasten v. S. 2DO Pac. 670.
29 P. v. Dingle 56 Cal. App. 445.
ciable degree, '29 of ability to operate
a car. Going beyond that, a New Jersey
Court held that "one driving an auto-
mobile on a public street while under
the influence of intoxicating liquor
offends against the . . . Act even
though he drives so slowly and so skill.
fully and carefully that the public is not
annoyed or endangered."3 0 Quite apart
from the problem of precise terminol-
ogy, there arise certain questions of
fact and of policy in connection with
this problem. It is unsafe driving that
is the evil-not the "mere drunken-
ness." Proscription beyond overt be-
havior might well open the door to
abuse by police; and it must never be
forgotten that prevention of such abuse
is as important as is prevention of
harmful behavior by the lay citizenry
-perhaps more so. On the other hand,
it is sometimes asserted that any
amount of alcohol, however slight,
diminishes driving ability. This is a
question of fact, still to be determined.
For legal purposes, we must be con-
fined to perceptible lessened ability,
even though the ideal may well be to
make the offense provable by facts
other than reckless or negligent driv-
ing. Just how this could be worked
out is a difficult problem. Preservation
of life is offset by mores that oppose
sumptuary legislation, and by values
that insist upon legal guarantees
against official abuse. Nor can limits
of effective enforcement of any sweep-
ing law be ignored. Thus, for the
present at least, the proper standard
would seem to be that of safe driving;
so State v. Rogers, 91 N. 1. L. 212.
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in the nature of the case, it is impos-
sible to formulate it any more definite-
ly than driving with "due care under
the circumstances."
A third problem concerns what the
lawyers rather indiscriminately call
the "subjective" and "objective" tests.
Should the driving (allegedly under
the influence of alcohol) be compared
with the defendant's own driving at
other times, or with the driving of "an
ordinary prudent, reasonable man"
under the same circumstances as in
the case at hand? A Committee of the
National Safety Council recommends
the former test as the fairer. "It is
felt," they say, "that the better defini-
tion compares the individual alleged to
be under the influence with himself at
normal."'3 1 In like vein an Arizona
court held: "The important query is,
'Was the driver of the vehicle under
the influence of intoxicating liquor to
the extent that he did not have the
clearness of intellect or control of him-
self that he otherwise would have
had?' "" On the other hand, in Cali-
fornia the standard is the manner in
which "an ordinarily prudent and
cautious man in the full possession of
his faculties, using reasonable care,
would operate or drive a similar vehicle,
under like conditions. '33 The problem
is really a very complicated one. The
test of how a "reasonable man" would
have acted is employed in manslaughter
cases and generally in cases of crim-
31 Tests for Driver Intoxication, National
Safety Council (1937) p. 21.
32 Weston v. State, 65 Pac. (2d) (Ariz.) 652.
33 P. v. Dingle, 56 Cal. App. 445. So, too a
New York court held "Hence for the purposes
of the statute under which defendant is con-
inal negligence. Since the penalties
are relatively slight in drunken driv-
ing cases as compared with those for
manslaughter, it is apparent that if the
application of the subjective test is un-
fair, it is much less so in the former.
In these, also, the cases are so very
numerous that, as a matter of practical
administration, it is thought to be nec-
essary to apply a simple, objective
standard despite the fact that it may
be unjust in a small number of partic-
ular cases. Beyond that, the paramount
need for maintenance of minimum
standards of traffic performance also
indicates the superiority of the "rea-
sonable man" test. But I do not wish
to give the impression that the issue is
not debatable. No one can rest content
with a rule that penalizes morally
innocent persons. For my part, I should
want to explore the possibility of
reconciling the two objectives: main-
tenance of minimum traffic standards
and justice to each accused person.
A fourth major problem concerns
the terms "common drunkard" and
"habitual drunkenness." In Rhode
Island, "every person who shall have
been convicted three times, within a
period of six months of intoxication,
or who shall be proved to have been
thus intoxicated three times within the
period of six weeks, shall be deemed
a common drunkard." A Massachu-
setts statute declares that a "common
drunkard" may be punished for va-
victed, he is intoxicated when he has imbibed
enough liquor to render him incapable of giving
that attention and care to the operation of his
automobile that a man of prudence and reason-
able intelligence would give." People v. Weaver,
188 App. Div. 395.
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grancy, but does not define the term.
In a Massachusetts case, 4 the court
held that a "common" drunkard must
not only have the habit of getting
drunk, but must, also, offend the pub-
lic peace and order. The word "com-
mon" thus seems to be used there in
the sense of "public. ' 35 A Wisconsin
court, on the other hand, convicted a
defendant of vagrancy as a "common
drunkard" though he was intoxicated
in his own home.3 6  Apparently, the
term was there interpreted to mean an
"habitual drunkard.
'37
When used in statutes requiring that
an "habitual drunkard" be placed in
an institution for a cure, most of the
cases hold that the term means a per-
son who, as a result of drinking intoxi-
cating liquor, is incapable of taking
care of himself or his property. "The
trend of legislation is to treat habitual
drunkenness as a disease of mind and
body, analogous to insanity, and to put
in motion the power of the state, as the
guardian of all of its citizens, to save
the habitual drunkard, his family, and
society from the consequences of his
habit. It is not a penal but a paternal
statute. This statute is limited to per-
34 Commonwealth v. Whitney, 71 Mass. 85,
(1855).
35 Commonwealth v. McNamee, 12 Mass. 285
(1873) and State v. Savage, 7 So. 183 (Alabama,
1890) hold that a common drunkard must be an
habitual drunkard.
36 Pollon v. State, 261 N. H. 224, (1935). The
Wisconsin statute on drunkenness provides that
the person be found "in any public place." Sec.
351, 59.
37 The Iowa statute provides that: "A habitual
drunkard is a vagrant. He may be kept in the
common jail for any time, not exceeding six
months, at hard larbor." Code of Iowa, sec.
13385. So, too, La. Dart's Cr. Stats. 1932, sec. 1233.
38 Leavitt v. City of Morris, 117 N. W. 393,
(Minnesota, 1908).
sons who have lost the power or will
to control their appetite for intoxicat-
ing liquors, and have a fixed habit of
drunkenness, who are in need of care
and treatment, and to those it would
be dangerous to leave at large."38
Again, the courts hold that the term
has quite a different meaning when
used in statutes prohibiting the sale of
liquor to "habitual drunkards." Thus
a Texas Court declared: 39 "It is here
used in common acceptation, and the
capacity of a person to take care of
himself or property is not in issue, and
is immaterial."' 0 A number of divorce
cases hold that an "habitual drunkard"
is one whose habit it is to get drunk,
and that it is not necessary that he lack
will power to control his appetite for
drink or be unable to carry on his
business.41 Other divorce cases, how-
ever,4 2 hold that there must be inability
to control the appetite. Finally, cases
dealing with the removal of a public
official from office 43 because of "habit-
ual drunkenness," hold that "the
phrase, 'habitual drunkenness,' must
be construed with reference to the
particular mischief intended to be
remedied by the law-makers. If drink-
39 Campbell v. Jones, 21 S. W. 723, (Texas,
1893).
40 Cf. Wilson v. White, 69 S. W. 989, (Texas,
1901); Lester v. Sampson, 180 S. W. 419, (Mis-
souri, 1915).
41 See Page v. Page, 86 P. 582 (Washington,
1906); Walton v. Walton, 8 p. 110 (Kansas,
1885); Richards v. Richards, 19 Ill. App. 465
(1886); and Burns v. Burns, 13 Fla. 376. Cf.
"he is, nevertheless, an habitual drunkard if his
habit injures his health, affects his capacity to
carry on his trade or business, disables him
from supporting his family, or from properly
carrying out his duties as a married man and
a father." Korth v. Korth, 33 N. Z. L. R. 290
at p. 292.
42 Garrett v. Garrett, 252 Ill. 318 (1911).
43 State v. Savage, 7 So. 183, (Alabama, 1890).
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ing renders the incumbent practically
or morally unfit for office he is classed
as an habitual drunkard."
Thus, it is apparent that we encoun-
ter serious difficulties concerning repe-
tition of the offense. The best clue to
disentangling the various meanings, is
that the lines of distinction seem to
run in terms of the purposes of the
various enactments. Generally, a com-
mon drunkard is a repeater in public
places, but not a chronic alcoholic. An
"habitual drunkard" may mean a re-
peater, but not in public44 and not a
chronic alcoholic; it may mean one
who neglects his wife, and aggravates
that misconduct by frequent intoxica-
tion; it may mean a diseased person
who cannot look after himself, and so
on. These distinctions are significant
in law because different consequences
are attached to the respective determi-
nations. But are the distinctions sound
empirically? Especially, are the dis-
tinctions drawn between "common
drunkards" and diseased alcoholics
sound? The problem is, again, much
more than a linguistic or a technically
legal one. Nor can one assume that
the medical experts have the answers
ready at hand for they are in sharp
disagreement even as to what consti-
tutes "chronic alcoholism." 45 Obvious-
ly there is here indicated a broad field
for collaboration of legal scholars and
44This apparently contradicts the general
view that criminal drunkenness is public.
45 "Opinions as to what constitutes chronic
alcoholism vary widely. At one extreme stand
those who maintain that the daily moderate
use of beer or wine at dinner constitutes
chronic alcoholism, while at the other extreme
are those who insist on constant intoxication
medical and social scientists, one that
holds the promise of abundantly worth-
while discoveries as the result of such
joint research.
I have urged that instead of think-
ing about drunkenness as a crime in
itself, the need is to consider various
situations, activities, instrumentalities,
and professions, fraught with unusual
danger when the various actors are
under the influence of liquor. The
description of the various relevant
behaviors is one part of the legislative
task; it includes that particular element
of this criminal behavior designated
by the term "intoxicated" or "under
the influence of liquor." The question
I wish to raise now concerns the apt-
ness of regarding evidence of any spe-
cific per cent of alcohol in the brain
as proof of being "under the influence"
or "intoxicated" in any and all cases.
It is with this question in mind as
well as that concerning improvement
in trial procedure, that I should like to
call attention briefly to the well-known
chemical tests to determine intoxica-
tion. For the most part, in this coun-
try, we still depend on ordinary
observation to provide proof of intoxi-
cation-staggering, drowsiness, boister-
ousness, inability to enunciate clearly,
and the like. Such behavior may, how-
ever, be caused by many conditions
other than alcohol: by certain diseases,
as the criterion for such a diagnosis. The
writer reserves the term chronic alcoholism for
those whose drinking interferes with their nor-
mal occupational and social activities, whether
this occurs constantly or periodically." Mer-
rill Moore, The Intoxications, Modern Medical
Therapy in General Practice, 1940, p. 1148.
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shock, various physical impediments,
etc."6 The usual testimony can accord-
ingly be readily opposed-and the
burden of proof beyond any reasonable
doubt is on the prosecution. In an
effort not to supplant but to supple-
ment the usual testimony by objective
tests, many experiments have been
made in recent years on the correlation
of alcohol in the brain with that in
various body substances, especially
blood, urine, spinal fluid, and breath.
A substantial and respectable literature
has grown up on the subject; there is
neither need nor opportunity to review
it here.'7 I believe that most writers
on the subject are agreed that the tests,
if very carefully made, have some value
to determine the issue of intoxication.
But many doubts have been raised,
especially concerning alcoholic toler-
ance and other variations induced by
the state of health, the contents of the
stomach, the form of liquor taken, etc.
One expert in this field asserts that
"all people are under the influence of
alcohol with a blood alcohol concentra-
tion of 0.15 per cent (3/20%) ."148 It is
evident that it is necessary to determine
just what is meant by being "under
the influence"-and we have noted the
difficulties which the courts have in
this regard; and, secondly, assuming
that agreement on this can be reached
46 "Medical authorities state that there are
about 60 pathological conditions that produce
one or more of the same symptoms in the hu-
man body as alcohol." Tests for Driver Intoxi-
cation (1937) Presented at Twenty-Sixth Na-
tional Safety Congress, p. 6, pub. by National
Safety Council, Chicago.
47 See Ladd and Gibson, The Medico-Legal
Aspects of the Blood Test to Determine Intoxi-
cation (1939) 24 Ia. L. Rev. 191; cf. Vold, Lab-
oratory Tests for Alcoholism in Motor Accident
Prosecutions (1938) 17 Nebr. L. Bul. 251.
by qualified persons, what about the
specific percentage stated above?
Based upon the above formula, a
recent Indiana statute on drunken driv-
ing provides that "Evidence that there
was, at the time, fifteen hundredths per
cent, or more, by weight of alcohol in
his blood, is prima facie evidence that
the defendant was under the influence
of intoxicating liquor sufficiently to
lessen his driving ability within the
meaning of the statutory definitions of
the offenses. 14 9 This means that such
evidence is deemed so trustworthy
that any and all persons whose blood
contains 15 hundredths per cent alco-
hol must be found guilty of drunken
driving, in the absence of any contra-
dictory evidence. The judge or jury
may accept such evidence as proof
beyond any reasonable doubt. As
noted, I think the tests have some pro-
bative value; I should be willing to
argue for the admissibility of such evi-
dence upon proper safeguards as to the
testing being assured. But I am some-
what dubious of an inflexible rule
because highly qualified experts deny
the validity of the tests.50 It may very
well be that the above tests are valid
for drunken driving, and that the
problem in this regard is solely one of
education. Much more questionable
are assertions that it is possible to lay
*8 Dr. R. N. Harger, Indiana University
School of Medicine, in Indiana State Police
Drunkometer School, June 1940, p. 12.
49State Highway Traffic Act (1939) Act V.
par. 54 (2), and see Recent Developments in
Chemical Tests for Intoxication under the Mo-
tor Vehicle Laws (1940), 1 Quart. Jour. Studies
on Alcohol 182-9.
50 See Vold, op. cit. supra; also Dickson, The
Medico-Legal Aspects of Drunkenness (1935)
3 Medico-Legal and Criminal. Rev. 280; alco C.
Slot, id. 283, 289.
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down a single specific percentage to
determine "under the influence" for
all activities. But a very small per-
centage of alcohol in the brain might
diminish ability to pilot an aeroplane;
a greater percentage might not dimin-
ish ability to drive an automobile safe-
ly; and a very much greater percentage
might not prevent the same individual
from walking home without interfer-
ence to anyone.5 1 It is apparent that
there must be further study of the
problems along the lines indicated
before sound legal control can be
established.
Penalties and Treatment
As regards legal penalties and treat-
ments, I shall be quite brief. A variety
of sanctions is employed: fine, revoca-
tion of driving license (40 states),
impounding of the vehicle if it is regis-
tered in the defendant's name (7
states), revocation of license to practice
certain professions, removal from
office, imprisonment, and hospitaliza-
tion. There is little uniformity in this
regard among the various states. The
penalties for drunken driving, for
example, include imprisonment for the
first offense, in five states; fines but no
imprisonment in two states; and the
rest provide fine or imprisonment, or
both. There is very wide range in the
amount of the fine. 2 Delaware imposes
a fine of fifty cents for every intoxica-
. i Dr. Harger's figures are given in connec-
tion with driving an automobile.
52 The above statistics are from Motor-Ve-
hicle Traffic Conditions in the U. S. U. S.
Government Prtg. Office, 1938.
53This is rare in American States. The
French Code Penal provides that persons found
intoxicated in public shall be taken to a place
tion; in New Jersey it costs one dollar.
Florida apparently allows a fine of
$3,000 and imprisonment for three
years, or both, for the second offense.
In Massachusetts, the court may dis-
charge an offender, "if satisfied that the
accused has not four times been
arrested for drunkenness within a
year." 3 The Arkansas statute provides
for confinement until sober.5 4 These
extreme variations in penalty cannot
be justified on any rational basis known
to me. They speak eloquently for the
need of thorough study of penal and
treatment methods which affect hun-
dreds of thousands of our fellow citi-
zens annually.
A random selection of cases reveals
an almost equal diversity in judicial
sentences. In a fairly recent Florida
case, a man convicted of his second
offense of drunkenness was sentenced
to "hard labor in the state prison for
a period of fifteen months."5 5 An Iowa
court held that one year's imprisonment
was not too severe where a drunken
driver had injured the occupant of
another car.5 6  Not long thereafter,
another Iowa court was sustained in
its sentence of one year's imprisonment
for drunken driving where no one was
injured, but the defendant had pre-
viously been convicted of bootlegging.
7
An Oklahoma court reduced a year's
sentence to six months, on the ground
that there was no collision, and no
of detention (not a jail) and released when
sober. This is regarded not as a penal measure
but rather as one of public safety. Law of Oct.
1, 1917, sec. 15. Petite Coll. Dalloz, p. 369.
54 Ann. Laws, Vol. 9, ch. 272, sec. 45.
fir Frazier v. S. 1924, 100 So. 155.
56 S. v. Fahey, 207 N. W. 608.
57 S. v. Dillard, 1928, 221 N. W. 817.
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damage.58 Thus, the reputation of the
offender, his criminal record, if any,
and the presence of" any aggravating
circumstances appear to be the general
factors considered by the courts in
fixing sentences. These certainly are
pertinent factors; and it may be as-
sumed, further, that intelligent admin-
istration mitigates much of the evil of
archaic, ill-conceived statutes. What
the judges need is information that will
clarify the whole problem of treatment
in drunkenness cases, familiarize them
with the practices in other states as
well as in their own, and bring to their
attention the opinions of informed
scholars as well as the results of careful
researches. We can speak quite defi-
nitely concerning the most common of
all sentences-the fine. For it is com-
ing to be generally recognized that this
is the least satisfactory method of pun-
ishment; in a vast number of cases, fine
means imprisonment for non-payment.
In a recent study of prison inmates in
Indiana, sentenced for drunkenness, it
was stated that "A majority of the men
were in no position to pay fines, re-
gardless of how small the levy may
have been."5 This tradition of visiting
extra penalties on the poor, present in
the old statute of James I, common in
colonial times, persisting today, needs
to be resolutely attacked; drunkenness
offers as promising a field as any. One
possible reform is suggested by the
New York statute which permits pay-
ment of the fine in installments.60 But
5s Clark v. S., 1927, 256 P. 941.
59 Ralph Schofield, Mss.
60 Cahill's Consol. Laws, 1930, 41-1221.
61 See The Commitment of Alcoholics to
this hardly represents a fundamental
solution of the problem.
It is difficult to generalize about the
problem of treatment because a great
variety of harms and personalities is
involved; and especially because of the
prevalence of sweeping, fatuous claims
that all would be well quickly if only
we turned the entire matter over to
the experts. The really optimistic datum
is that there is considerable intuitive
understanding of psychological causes
of drunkenness; accordingly, excepting
serious personal injury, there is no
great obstacle to elimination of puni-
tive methods where others are reason-
ably indicated.
It is frequently assumed that there
exists sufficient knowledge to treat all
inebriates scientifically; there is wide-
spread criticism of present, so-called
legal methods. The usual recommenda-
tion fits into the formula: "Don't pun-
ish; use the hospital or asylum as in
other recognized diseases." I do not
propose to challenge this diagnosis
now-except as to its unvarying gener-
ality. On the one hand, many states
now provide for hospitalization in
cases of chronic drunkenness.6 1 But
the major point is that there is no uni-
form medical opinion as to the best
treatment for all the various types of
alcoholics. To cite only one instance,
consider the views of Dr. Olaf Kinberg,
a distinguished Swedish psychiatrist.
He argues that only in a small minority
of cases is hospitalization for an ex-
tended period appropriate.6 2 He asserts
Medical Institutions (1940) 1 Jour. of Studies
on Alcohol 372-387.
62 Olaf Kinberg Alcohol and Criminality, 5
J. Cr. L. and Criminol. (1915) p. 581.
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that "the alcoholic should not and can-
not generally be considered as suffer-
ing from a disease. A treatment in any
sort medical will therefore not be indi-
cated. On the contrary, the treatment
should be based on the opinion that the
alcoholic is a man who in the majority
of cases can abstan from ethyli.
drinks if you only give him sufficient
motives. When it concerns a criminal
alcoholic these motives need scarcely
be sought elsewhere than among the
means which society already has at its
disposal to react against criminality in
general, to-wit: Payment for damages,
privation of rights, fines, penalties
against liberty, to last a definite time,
or more or less indefinite, etc. .... ,63
And he argues that the punishment
should vary in accordance with the
dangerousness of the offender. 4 This
and the like opinions of other experts
emphasize the unsettled and divergent
views among qualified specialists con-
cerning the methods of treatment
which should be adopted.
The problem of treatment is further
complicated by the fact that the
offenders in drunkenness cases are, as
a group, much older than others. In a
study conducted at the Indiana State
Farm, it was discovered that 89% of
those confined for drunkenness were
30 years old or older.6 5 National sta-
tistics covering the first nine months of
this year show that 15.2% of those
arrested for driving while intoxicated
63 Id. p. 584. See too, Dr. E. W. McCormick,
Conflicting Medical Testimony in Cases of
Drunkenness (1937, 101 Justice of Peace, 196).
64 Ibid.
65 Schofield, ross.
6 3rd Quart. Bull. Uniform Crime Reports,
1940.
were under 25 years of age, and that
only 12.5% of those arrested for
drunkenness were under twenty-five.
Compare these with the figures for the
same period showing 63.9% under 25
in arrests for burglary and 72.7% for
auto theft. 6 It is common knowledge
that rehabilitation becomes progres-
sively more difficult as the age of these
offenders increases. Another unfor-
tunate fact is that women form a sub-
stantial number of offenders in drunk-
enness cases. Of 740 women sentenoed
to jails and houses of correction in
Massachusetts in 1935, 405 were sen-
tenced for drunkenness.67 Similar fig-
ures, I think, could be shown elsewhere.
The futility of punitive methods
applied to chronic alcoholic psycho-
paths is apparent.6 8 To many observers
of the endless stream of repeaters who
make the round from court-to-jail an
amazing number of times, it seems
absurd to continue the existing puni-
tive methods. That our officials are
seriously deficient in their handling of
the difficult problems of chronic
drunkenness and of underlying psycho-
pathic conditions will be generally
conceded by thoughtful persons. Yet,
as noted, the presently popular "solu-
tion" of letting down the punitive bars
entirely is unsound. The premises
upon which such recommendations rest
are two: punitive methods have failed
entirely; and, the psychiatrists can
effect cures. Both of these assertions
87 Women and Girl Offenders in Massachu-
setts (1938) p. 29, pub. by The Mass. Child
Council, Inc.
68 Anderson, The Alcoholic as seen in Court
(1916) 7 J. of Crim. Law & Criminol. 89.
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are over-statements; both suffer from
the error of particularism. Granted,
on the one hand, that most chronic
alcoholics suffer from nervous ailments,
does it follow that punishment has no
utility? Certainly as regards the need
to protect the public, highly competent
opinion can be marshalled to support
the contrary.69 Secondly, is it a fact
that psychiatrists can remove the
psychopathic condition that is the root
of repeated drunkenness? In some
cases, certainly, in others possibly; in
a great many, assuredly not. I think
we must recognize this frankly; and
recognize also that the limitations on
psychiatric knowledge must condition
legislation and administration of the
law. Beyond that are still enormous
difficulties from the viewpoint of ad-
ministration of the law. The very
prevalence of chronic drunkenness and
the length of treatment at the hands of
qualified doctors-even when cures are
assured-place great difficulties in the
way of immediate achievement of ideal
laws and administration. Finally the
psychiatrist must realize, as he fre-
quently does not, that there are distinc-
tively legal goals that represent the
achievements of centuries of struggle.
Not infrequently these are at variance
with scientific dictates. Thus, suppose
it is true that a chronic alcoholic can be
cured in five years of confinement;
69 See Dr. W. N. East, Alcoholism and Crime
in relation to Manic-Depressive Disorder (1936)
230 Lancet 162-3.
despite the euphemistic terminology of
recent reform, such treatment is not
only punishment but may be cruel and
inhuman through its very duration.
One "altruistic" alienist argued some
years ago that "The inveterate alco-
holics and those with criminal records
should be detained indefinitely."T° It is
impossible here to discuss the effect of
the various values represented in law,
upon the availability of even scientifi-
cally demonstrated knowledge. But I
venture to assert that unless scientists
are brought to some awareness of the
nature of the legal problems, their dis-
coveries and their propagandization
may do more harm than good. The
problem as it presents itself to thought-
ful persons is always more difficult; it
challenges to preserve the guarantees
of our legal system and at the same
time make such use of science as is
compatable with these social values.
Without the slightest doubt, there is
great room for improvement in the
drunkenness laws, methods of treat-
ment, and administration; many valu-
able reforms can be adopted that will
not damage the existing political insti-
tutions or violate the underlying ethical
ideals. The avenue to their discovery
is collaboration of various scholars and
experts who are fully aware of the
complexity of the problem.
70 Gordon, Prophylactic, Administrative and
Medico-Legal Aspects of Alcoholism (1914) 4
J. Cr. Law and Criminol. 872.
